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The paper empirically examines the influence of property rights protection institutions 
and bilateral investment treaties on FDI flows to the MENA region. The paper uses panel 
data on 13 MENA countries for the period 1985-2008, and adopts a least squares dummy 
variable approach. Empirical evidence shows that FDI flows are government 
expropriation risk-elastic. The influence of bilateral investment treaties is complementary 
to improvement in corruption and quality of government bureaucracy. World oil prices 
and labor force have a positive influence on FDI flows emphasizing the importance of 
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The paper empirically examines the influence of property rights protection 
institutions and bilateral investment treaties on FDI flows to the MENA region. Bilateral 
investment treaties are contracted to strengthen property rights protection, reduce 
political risk, and thus encourage FDI. The paper uses panel data on 13 MENA countries 
for the period 1985-2008, and adopts a least squares dummy variable to account for 
unobservable country effects.2
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the empirical model. Section III 
discusses the data and empirical issues and the estimation methodology adopted. Section 
IV discusses the empirical results and section V concludes. 
 Empirical evidence shows that the risk of government 
expropriation of investment matters the most to FDI flows; FDI flows are elastic to risk 
improvements. The influence of bilateral investment treaties is complementary to 
improvement in corruption and quality of government bureaucracy. Oil prices and labor 
force have a positive influence on FDI flows emphasizing the importance of economic 
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II. Empirical Model 
The empirical model builds theoretically on the location advantage hypothesis of 
Dunning’s (1981) ownership-location-internalization paradigm. Of the many location 
advantages that characterize MENA countries, natural and human resource endowments 
stand out. Thus the empirical model is expressed as: 
 




5ln(OILit) + β6ln(PRICEit)  +  β7ln(LABORit)  + β8ln(TRADEit) + 
β9ln(INFLATIONit) + β10ln(WFDIFLOWSit) + εit  
 
(1) 
where FDIFLOWS is annual FDI inflows, FDIFLOWSit-1 
We consider four dimensions of property rights protection based on the 
International Country Risk Guide’s political risk index: investment profile, corruption, 
law and order, and bureaucracy quality. Investment profile refers to the risk of investment 
lagged dependent variable, 
INSTIT property rights protection domestic institution, BIT total number of bilateral 
investment treaties entered into force, BITINSTIT is an interaction term between the 
natural logarithm of domestic institutions on the one hand and bilateral investment 
treaties on the other, OIL oil production, PRICE oil price, LABOR labor force, TRADE 
trade, INFLATION inflation rate, WFDIFLOWS world FDI flows, and ε an error term. 
The subscripts i and t are country and time indicators with i=1,...,N and t=1,...,T. The 
variables are in logarithmic form except for BIT. Appendix A provides more information 
on the construction of variables. 
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expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays, clearly influencing PRP. 
Corruption is a threat to property rights protection as it enables people to assume 
positions of power through patronage rather than ability, constituting a threat to the rights 
of foreign investors as they facilitate government expropriation of investment or when 
direct conflicts with those patrons arise. Law and order refers to the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system as well as the popular observance of the law. Institutional 
strength and quality of bureaucracy refers to bureaucracy governing without drastic 
changes in policy when governments change. High scores on each of these institutions 
indicate better performance. 
 
III.  Data, Empirical Issues and Estimation Methodology   
To get around zeros and negative values of FDI flows, we use the same approach adopted 
by Blonigen and Davies (2004) and Neumayer and Spess (2005). The same approach is 
used with INSTIT and OIL. Data on bilateral investment treaties are obtained from the 
UNCTAD FDI online database. 
Unobservable country effects and multicollinearity are empirical issues we 
account for. For the former, we used a least squares dummy variables approach. In 
detecting the latter, we use the variance inflation factor (VIF). Multicollinearity has been 
detected between some country dummies, namely Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, 
and LABOR in particular. Dropping these dummies has reduced VIF from a range of 30-
37 to about 3. Although Bowerman et al (2005) consider multicollinearity as “severe” if 
the mean VIF is substantially greater than 1, we must accept some high multicollinearity 






IV. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the estimation results. Each column corresponds to a domestic 
institution.  
The lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications suggesting persistence of FDI flows to MENA countries. In the first 
specification for example, an increase in FDI flows of the previous year by 10 percent 
increases FDI flows in the current year by about 2.8 percent. 
Out of the four domestic institutional functions, investment profile or the risk of 
investment expropriation matters the most to FDI flows with positive and statistically 
significant coefficient, suggesting that FDI flows are elastic to improvements in 
investment expropriation risk. A reduction in the risk of investment expropriation by 10 
percent increases FDI flows by nearly 20 percent. 
BIT on the other hand is statistically insignificant, while the interaction term 
BITINSTIT is positive and statistically significant in two of the four specifications 
suggesting complementarity between improvement in corruption and the quality of 
government bureaucracy on the one hand and bilateral investment treaties on the other.  
World oil price and labor force play an important role in attracting FDI flows in 
MENA countries. FDI flows are nearly unit elastic with respect to world oil price and the 




Domestic economic policies seem to have no influence on FDI flows. Coefficients 
of TRADE and INFLATION have signs that we would expect but are statistically 
insignificant. Neither is the coefficient of WFDIFLOWS. 
For country specific effects, the effect for Qatar is noticeable. The country 
dummy coefficient for Qatar is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
in all specifications. In comparison, country dummy coefficients for Egypt, Syria, and 
Tunisia are statistically significant but only in some specifications.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The above empirical results highlight the importance of human resources and world oil 
price to FDI flows in the MENA region. Productive and low cost labor help attract FDI 
flows. In addition, by putting upward pressure on world oil price, economic growth in 
industrialized countries seems to be associated with these flows, as opposed to a global 
business cycle. 
In addition to these two factors, at the institutional level among the different 
property rights protection institutions, expropriation of private investments by the 
government appears to matter the most to foreign investors. A reduction in investment 
expropriation risk significantly encourages FDI flows to MENA countries. In addition, 
bilateral investment treaties complement the reduction in corruption and the improvement 
in bureaucracy quality, suggesting that government efforts to improve property rights 





Variables, Definitions, and Data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
FDIFLOWS FDI flows in millions of US$ (log)   UNCTAD’s FDI online database. 
BIT Total number of bilateral investment treaties 
entered into force. 
Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD’s 
bilateral investment treaties online database. 
INSTIT Domestic PRP institutional functions. These 
are a) investment profile, b) corruption, c) law 
and order, and d) bureaucracy quality (log). 
ICRG political risk index. 
BITINSTIT Interaction term between BIT and INSTITFN 
constructed as the product of INSTITFN (log 
form) and BIT. 
 
Author’s calculation. 
OIL Oil production in thousands of barrels per day 
(log).  
Energy Information Administration 
PRICE Crude oil price measured by the price of Saudi 
Arabian Light 34 in US$/barrel (log). 
Energy Information Administration 
LABOR Labor force (log). World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
TRADE Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of 
GDP (log). 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
INFLATION Inflation rate in percentage (log). Rate is 
calculated based on the consumer price index, 
except for Oman and UAE where it is based on 
GDP deflator. 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
WFDIFLOWS World FDI inflows in millions of US$ (in log 
form). 
Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD’s 
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Table 1: Institutions, Bilateral Investment Treaties and FDI Flows to MENA Countries 
Dependent Variable: Log of FDI Inflows 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES IP C L&O BQ 
FDIFLOWS(-1) 0.281a 0.297a 0.300a 0.297a 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.102) (0.101) 
INSTITFN 2.040a -0.387 -0.681 -0.956 
 (0.587) (0.793) (0.721) (1.038) 
BIT -0.141 -0.117 -0.057 -0.164 
 (0.099) (0.095) (0.099) (0.104) 
BITINSTITFN 0.009 0.114c 0.024 0.166b 
 (0.021) (0.058) (0.030) (0.072) 
OIL -0.142 -0.087 -0.063 -0.090 
 (0.106) (0.112) (0.105) (0.103) 
PRICE 0.984b 1.106b 1.007b 1.135b 
 (0.481) (0.510) (0.510) (0.485) 
LABOR 1.054a 0.919b 0.879b 1.065b 
 (0.404) (0.388) (0.403) (0.435) 
TRADE 2.302c 2.042 1.971 2.450c 
 (1.203) (1.238) (1.249) (1.306) 
INFLATION -0.099 -0.161 -0.201 -0.180 
 (0.155) (0.162) (0.165) (0.163) 
WFDIFLOWS 0.337 0.438 0.612 0.452 
 (0.325) (0.335) (0.371) (0.326) 
Egypt 1.805b 1.007 0.944 0.710 
 (0.820) (0.747) (0.788) (0.739) 
Oman 1.506 1.401 1.186 1.646 
 (0.935) (0.940) (0.922) (1.002) 
Qatar 2.499a 2.431a 2.489a 2.616a 
 (0.904) (0.838) (0.932) (0.946) 
Libya -1.617 -2.000 -2.132 -2.236 
 (1.528) (1.585) (1.529) (1.481) 
Kuwait -0.779 -1.246 -1.337 -1.232 
 (1.113) (1.080) (1.086) (1.049) 
Jordan -0.802 -0.893 -0.940 -0.964 
 (0.720) (0.783) (0.797) (0.754) 
Algeria -0.462 -0.579 -1.078 -0.860 
 (0.832) (0.829) (0.982) (0.752) 
UAE -0.365 -0.457 -0.628 -0.636 
 (1.273) (1.286) (1.287) (1.266) 
Syria 1.166c 0.488 0.425 0.191 
 (0.609) (0.549) (0.532) (0.643) 
Tunisia 1.190c 0.959 0.725 0.992c 
 (0.636) (0.615) (0.626) (0.587) 
Constant -32.643a -27.264a -27.769a -30.991a 
 (9.590) (8.915) (9.647) (10.257) 
     
Observations 279 279 279 279 
Adjusted R-squared 0.441 0.421 0.420 0.425 
VIF (mean) 3.13 2.99 3.19 3.25 
     
Notes: “IP”, “C”, “L&O” and “BQ” are investment profile, corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy 
quality, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
a,b,c denotes test statistic significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.  
